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Conference Venue: RAI Amsterdam, Europaplein 24, 1078 GZ Amsterdam, The Netherlands

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Friday, September 27 • 11:55am - 12:40pm
HTTP Desync Attacks: Smashing into the Cell Next Door

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HTTP requests are traditionally viewed as isolated, standalone entities. In this session, I'll introduce techniques for remote, unauthenticated attackers to smash through this isolation and splice their requests into others, through which I was able to play puppeteer with the web infrastructure of numerous commercial and military systems, rain exploits on their visitors, and harvest over $60k in bug bounties. Using these targets as case studies, I'll show you how to delicately amend victim's requests to route them into malicious territory, invoke harmful responses, and lure credentials into your open arms. I'll also demonstrate using backend reassembly on your own requests to exploit every modicum of trust placed on the frontend, gain maximum privilege access to internal APIs, poison web caches, and compromise what's possibly your most trusted login page. This is an attack the web is thoroughly unprepared for. Although documented over a decade ago, a fearsome reputation for difficulty and collateral damage has left it optimistically ignored for years while the web's susceptibility grew. By applying fresh ideas and new techniques, I'll unveil a vast expanse of vulnerable systems ranging from huge content delivery networks to bespoke backends. I'll help you tackle this legacy by sharing a refined methodology and open source tooling for black-box detection, assessment and exploitation with minimal risk of collateral damage. These will be developed from core concepts, ensuring you leave equipped to devise your own desync techniques and tailor (or thwart) attacks against your target of choice.

Speakers
avatar for James Kettle

James Kettle

Director of Research, PortSwigger Web Security
James Kettle is Director of Research at PortSwigger Web Security, where he designs and refines vulnerability detection techniques for Burp Suite's scanner. Recent work has focused on using web cache poisoning to turn caches into exploit delivery systems. James has extensive experience... Read More →


Friday September 27, 2019 11:55am - 12:40pm CEST
D201